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Criminals Behind the Veil:  
Political Philosophy and Punishment 
Chad Flanders* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is evidence everywhere that our criminal justice system is 
undergoing a crisis of practice. Increased police violence and the con-
comitant distrust of police in many communities, fear of aggressive en-
forcement tactics more generally, worries about widespread govern-
mental surveillance and, above all, a concern with overcriminalization 
and mass incarceration—these are the dreary and familiar stuff of daily 
headlines. But, this crisis of practice in turn reflects a deeper crisis of 
how we theorize about criminal law. We lack, for the most part, any 
worked-out theory of what the policing and processing of crime should 
look like. Nor do we have real consensus on what things should be 
criminalized.1 And while we have theories of punishment in seeming 
abundance, they address a world that is, for the most part, divorced 
from our current reality.2 
In particular, neither theories of deterrence nor retribution can ex-
plain, in any straightforward way, what is wrong with the warehousing 
of millions of people in prisons and jails across America.3 We live, as 
many have observed, in a “carceral state.”4 Our theories of criminal law 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I have written and rewritten 
this paper several times over the past 5 years. I am grateful to Ben Vilhauer, Danny Priel, Joshua 
Preiss, David Svolba, and an audience at the University of Minnesota-Mankato for comments on 
a much earlier, unpublished, draft. Thanks also to Steven Galoob, Josh Kleinfeld, Tommie 
Shelby, Erin Kelly, Vincent Chiao, and Gabe Mendlow for comments at a University of Michi-
gan Criminal Law Theory workshop. A first try at some of these ideas can also be found in Part 
III of Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Saved?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309 (2014). 
 1.  For the exception that proves the rule, see DOUG HUSACK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION 
(2008) (outlining the crisis of overcriminalization and proposing a theory of what things are 
properly criminalized).  
 2.  I address this point in more detail in Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins, Introduction, 
in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins eds., 2016). 
 3.  See Chad W. Flanders, What is Wrong with Mass Incarceration? (Sept. 5, 2015) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author). See also Vincent Chiao, Mass Incarceration and the 
Theory of Punishment, CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1 (2015) (arguing that major theories of punishment 
unable to give a satisfactory explanation of what is wrong with mass incarceration).  
 4.  See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Naomi Murakawa, Mapping the Carceral State, 16 
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and punishment, far from giving us grounds to criticize that practice, 
could in some ways be said to be propping it up.5 If we need to punish 
harshly because retribution demands it, or because deterrence requires 
it, then the carceral state is not an unfortunate reality. It may be a nor-
mative necessity. 
There are piecemeal solutions to the problem of the carceral state 
that have been offered. They are important, but I do not want to pre-
sent another piecemeal solution in this essay, things that simply work 
at the margins. Rather, what we need now is a comprehensive diagnosis 
of our present situation—what has gone wrong, and how to fix it. And 
the way to begin a comprehensive diagnosis is to turn to political phi-
losophy and its relative neglect of problems of criminal law and crim-
inal punishment. Political theory would seem to be the place to address 
questions of the power of the state and the limits of that power, espe-
cially when it comes to the use of force against its own citizens. It 
would seem, then, that we might turn to political philosophy to get a 
grip on what is wrong with living in a carceral state. 
But political philosophy has largely been silent on these topics.6 
This silence is especially glaring in the case of that figure that may be 
said to be the dominant political philosopher of the twentieth century, 
and who will serve as the focal point of my discussion: John Rawls. 
Rawls set the agenda of political philosophy in the late twentieth cen-
tury and still sets it now, well into the twenty-first, especially in his 
book A Theory of Justice.7 Over the years, some have tried to enlist 
Rawls in the project of thinking critically and creatively about criminal 
justice and punishment. However, they have been largely unsuccessful 
in using Rawls to set a broader agenda for a comprehensive look at how 
and why we punish and how we might think of punishment differently. 
This paper tries to do precisely that, but we first must be open about 
how hard Rawls makes things for us. 
It is not that Rawls says next to nothing about punishment in A 
Theory of Justice. It is that the next to nothing he does say is awfully 
depressing and as result has been mostly ignored.8 But the passages 
 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 221 (2012).  
 5.  For this worry, especially in regard to retributive theory, see my discussion in Chad 
W. Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87 (2010). 
 6.  See Flanders & Hoskins, supra note 2. 
 7.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 8.  In her otherwise impressive paper (to which I am in debt), Sharon Dolovich ignores 
the passages where Rawls does talk about punishment, and develops a Rawlsian theory of pun-
ishment in spite of them. This is probably a wise move (as I argue in this paper), but it does not, 
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where he does talk about punishment are worth paying attention to 
(and being depressed about) for at least two reasons. The first is that 
on their face these passages seem pretty harsh: the passages seem to 
condemn certain people (criminals) to “misfortune” based on “their 
natures” or “the kind of persons” that “they are.”9 In one place Rawls 
suggests that the only solution for dealing with such people (whose 
nature is their misfortune) is to ramp up the punishments for them 
until those who do not manage well in the well-ordered society are 
pummeled into complying.10 
The second reason is that the passages are not only harsh taken by 
themselves; they seem especially out of place given the tone of A The-
ory of Justice as a whole. “In justice as fairness,” Rawls says at one 
point, we “share one another’s fate.”11 Such expressions of shared citi-
zenship and solidarity do not pop up when Rawls turns to those who 
violate natural duties of justice. Their bad acts are not the product of 
social circumstance and accident;12 instead, they reveal the “bad char-
acters” of those who commit such acts.13 Their fate we do not share; 
them, we punish.14 
Maybe Rawls felt his theory led him to write these passages and so 
he could not help them. Or maybe the passages were just tossed off 
and not given much thought. In either case, when it comes to punish-
ment, Rawls’s greatest “sin” may really be one of omission. He does 
not treat punishment at great length—just a few pages in all—and 
probably is at least in part responsible for the glaring lack of treatment 
of punishment in political philosophy15 over the last several decades. 
But Rawls is also guilty of committing some serious “sins” in these 
 
I think, tell the full story. See Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 
7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 326 n.40 (2004) (dismissing the few passages where Rawls discusses 
punishment).  
 9.  RAWLS, supra note 7, at 576 (emphasis added). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 102. 
 12.  See, e.g., id. at 104 (“The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that 
enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character 
depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no 
credit.”).  
 13.  Id. at 315. 
 14.  See generally Bonnie Honig, Rawls on Politics and Punishment, 46 POL. RES. Q. 99 
(1993). Honig is more insistent than I am that these passages are essential to Rawls’s overall 
position in Theory.  
 15.  Not in philosophy simpliciter—there they have dozens of essays and books on philos-
ophy of punishment over the years. But they are not part of a systematic theory of justice. My 
hope is that this is starting to change.  
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passages.  Those passages read in context really do show a stark divide 
that Rawls paints between the distributive and the retributive, one 
which makes his passages on punishment especially off-putting and 
strange. When he talks about distributive justice, Rawls is open, ex-
pansive, unifying—and radical. However, when it comes to retributive 
justice, Rawls is exclusionary, unyielding, and harsh. He sounds very 
traditional, old-school. There is at the very least a tension here, and 
the question is whether we can reconcile the tension, or whether an-
other strand has to give way. 
That is the project of this paper: to figure out how to reconcile 
Rawls on punishment with Rawls on distributive justice—and to use 
that reconciliation as the beginnings of a broader framework within 
which to think about our current crisis of criminal justice. That is, the 
paper is not meant to be merely yet another exercise in Rawls’ exegesis, 
although it is partly that. It is also meant to be a map that shows how 
we got here and how we can get out. Thus, I want to see Rawls’ work 
to be representative of a certain blindness in political philosophy—a 
blindness that led political philosophers to neglect criminal justice and 
punishment in designing their theories.  But the way out of that is to 
do better political philosophy—not to leave political philosophy be-
hind.16 
In this regard, I find Rawls’ brief remarks on punishment telling 
because, taken a certain way, his remarks can be seen to fit into a fa-
miliar ideological pattern: welfare for the working poor, and prison for 
those who don’t work or cannot work and who fall into crime.17 Rawls 
is not responsible for this way of dividing the world and he certainly 
did not invent it, but his theory does seem at points to have a place 
alongside it. And not unrelatedly, his book has, if only tacitly, given 
permission for philosophers to separate distributive and retributive 
justice, and mostly to not think about the latter in political philoso-
phy.18 So at best, Rawls has given philosophers leave to separate pun-
 
 16.  See Chad Flanders, In Defense of Punishment Theory, and Contra Stephen, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 243 (2012). 
 17.  As many have noted, education/welfare and prison are both state responses to crime. 
For an extended meditation on this point, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF 
ORDER (2001). For a recent discussion, see Alex Lichtenstein, Mass Incarceration Has Become 
the New Welfare, ATLANTIC (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2015/09/mass-incarceration-has-become-the-new-welfare/404422/.  
 18.  This state of affairs seems to me to be a historical anomaly, but I won’t press that 
point here.  
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ishment from political philosophy. At worst, his theory gives us a seem-
ingly harsh view of punishment.19 
My paper has two parts. In the first part (Section II), I draw out the 
various threads in Rawls that lead him to his statements on punish-
ment. In some respects, this is well-trodden ground, especially re-
cently. First patch of well-trodden ground: Rawls is doing ideal theory. 
Punishment does not fit in ideal theory except in a very limited way, 
and when real punishment comes in, it is only at the edges of ideal 
theory and not as part-and-parcel of it. Second patch: Rawls thinks that 
distributive justice is not about desert, but retributive justice probably 
is, so we have a basic asymmetry which our theory has to account for 
and reflect. These are familiar topics in the literature. I want to lay 
them out, in the first part, sympathetically—maybe too sympatheti-
cally—before I try to show how they tend to look when set against a 
backdrop of what people in the wider culture were saying about pun-
ishment and welfare, and how Rawls strangely fits that mold, even 
when we can see him as breaking the mold in political philosophy more 
generally. 
The second part of my paper (Section III) lays out an argument in 
roughly two steps. The first step puts Rawls on punishment against the 
backdrop of Rawls on distributive justice to show the tensions within 
Theory both in terms of the text and in terms of the tone of the text. 
Pitting Rawls on punishment against Rawls on distributive justice 
makes Rawls on punishment seem conventional and conservative 
where his Theory as a whole is anything but.20 The second step asks 
what it would take to read and interpret Rawls on punishment in a way 
that would make it consistent with other parts of Rawls’ theories. This 
turns out to make Rawls a sort of radical on punishment, in the same 
way he was radical on distributive justice. 
At the end of the day, Rawls simply does not say much about pun-
ishment in Theory. We are left with hints, from which we must make 
guesses. But there are two ways we can go. We can mostly ignore what 
Rawls does say, and treat it as sort of off-shoot of some methodological 
choices Rawls made. That is certainly one thing we can do, and in Part 
I of my paper, I show how we can fairly disregard Rawls on punishment 
 
 19.  For the connection between retributive theory and harsh punishment (and the varie-
ties of ways punishment can be “harsh”), see my discussion in Flanders, supra note 5, at 87. 
 20.  Alan Gewirth wrote that his political theory was an attempt at an institutionalization 
of love. I don’t think this is too far off of what Rawls was doing in Theory. See RAWLS, supra 
note 7, at 105 (Rawls on fraternity).  
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and still feel OK about reading Theory as the great work on distribu-
tive justice it is. The other thing we can do is to try to figure out a 
theory of punishment that fits better with Theory as a whole, one that 
tries to imagine applying the open and expansive theory of distributive 
justice even to those who commit crimes. I find this latter path a much 
more promising—and exciting—way to go. It gives us hope that we 
can think about our criminal justice system not just in small ways, but 
in big ways: ways that point out how we can reform our institutions for 
the better. 
II. LIMITING THE DAMAGE OF RAWLS ON PUNISHMENT 
My aim in this part is to look at Rawls’s statements on punishment 
as things that are not essential to his theory, and even as positively ex-
trinsic to his project in Theory. Rawls warns us, early on, that he can-
not talk about punishment if his project is one of “ideal theory.” Pun-
ishment does emerge in Theory, but only on the margins. We make a 
mistake—I suggest on this sympathetic reading of Rawls—if we read 
his by-the-way comments on punishment as somehow disclosing 
deeper truths about his theory (I take this back a little in the next part 
of my paper). If the reading in this part is defensible, and I think it is 
for the most part, then excising most of what Rawls says on punish-
ment would still leave the structure and most of the content of justice 
as fairness intact. We might lament that Rawls then has really nothing 
to say about state punishment in Theory; but this may be better than 
interpreting him as saying wrong things about punishment in Theory. 
I am going to argue that, read generously, Rawls’s remarks on pun-
ishment are really not about implementing punishment, or how pun-
ishment would look in a non-ideal world. Rather, what he says on pun-
ishment is introduced at certain places to simply make a point about 
some other part of his theory or to make a necessary contrast. They 
are not positive statements about punishment at all. 
 
A. Ideal Theory and Punishment 
Rawls’s very first mention of punishment in Theory of Justice is, 
interestingly, in a list of topics that he would not be discussing. The 
subject of his book, Rawls says, is what a perfectly just society would 
look like. And if this is his subject, then there will be of necessity cer-
tain areas that he will not be covering because they involve issues that 
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arise only when people are acting unjustly to one another. If we are 
dealing with a society where everyone complies with the law, then we 
will not be dealing with various problems when only some people com-
ply with the law. These are topics such as “the theory of punishment, 
the doctrine of just war, and the justification of the various ways of 
opposing unjust regimes, ranging from civil disobedience and militant 
resistance to revolution and rebellion.”21 Rawls goes on to include in 
this category of things not part of his subject “questions of compensa-
tory justice and weighing one form of institutional injustice against one 
another.”22 Rawls does not deny these subjects are important; they are 
just not what he is dealing with in Theory. He wants a more systematic 
grasp of justice, and this means assuming full compliance. 
Another name for what Rawls says he is doing is “ideal” theory, 
and issues of less than full compliance would then fall into “non-ideal 
theory.” We first get the idea by assuming what the principles of justice 
would be if everyone followed the principles of justice; we then go on 
to treat other, non-ideal situations given the ideal principles of justice. 
The ideal/non-ideal distinction has been the subject of much (confus-
ing) debate,23 but here Rawls’s point seems simple enough. If we are 
going to be talking about what a perfectly just society would look like 
and we assume that such a society means everyone complies with the 
principles of justice, it follows that we won’t be dealing with what hap-
pens when people don’t follow the law. 
Taken as simply a stipulation, it is hard to quibble with this: if 
Rawls wants to leave some topic (or group of topics) for another day, 
then he can. We can say that this is the wrong starting point, or that it 
does not give us good principles of justice. But simply as a way of or-
ganizing his thoughts, it is not something that Rawls can really get 
right or wrong. It is what Rawls wants to do. One might also criticize 
Rawls for developing principles that no person could follow; but this 
is a criticism in a different register. That would be a criticism that 
Rawls was not even doing ideal theory well. But it is not a criticism just 
to say that Rawls is not saying what happens or how we are to decide 
 
 21.  Id. at 8. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  For an overview, see Laura Valentini, Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map, 
7 PHIL. COMPASS 654 (2012). See also Chad Flanders, The Mutability of Public Reason, 25 
RATIO JURIS. 180 (2012) (presenting thoughts on ideal theory in a slightly different context). 
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things when people break the rules—again, he is not trying to say an-
ything about those things.24 
Rawls returns later to the topic of punishment in Theory, so there 
is some sense in which his initial take at separating punishment from 
strict compliance theory fails. He said he could not talk about punish-
ment because he was doing ideal theory, and then it turns out he does 
talk about punishment, and even at times as part of an ideal theory. But 
it is important to see, at least at first, and if we are trying our best to 
be charitable, how Rawls’s subsequent discussions of punishment do 
not mean he is going against his early promise to stick with a theory of 
justice with the assumption of strict compliance. For it turns out that 
even though the ideal society will have a system of punitive sanctions, 
the sanctions in an “ideal” society will play a different role than they 
would in a society that was marked by law-breaking. And though it is 
tempting to read all the passages where Rawls talks about punishment 
as Rawls’s attempt to lay out a non-ideal theory, we should resist this 
temptation, and heed Rawls’s original admonition that he is doing only 
ideal theory. 
This point is clear in Rawls’s first extended discussion of punish-
ment in Theory, where he is explicit about the role of penal sanctions 
even in ideal theory.25 Here is how Rawls’s argument goes. When we 
enter society, we do not know one another’s motives.26 While we may 
know ourselves, or think we do, and know that we are motivated by 
our sense of justice to obey the law and follow the principles of justice, 
we do not know that this is the case with others.27 They may not have 
a fully developed sense of justice, and so may just be looking for the 
first chance to break the law and take advantages of the compliance of 
others. Or perhaps we may even suspect that we ourselves at times may 
succumb to temptation. If our obligation to obey the law was purely 
voluntary, and not a matter at least to some degree of not risking pun-
ishment, we may fear that the whole system would fall apart. 
In short, we might like there to be sanctions, either to boost our 
own possibly flagging motivations, or to make us feel better that others 
will be motivated to obey the law. If it were just a matter of following 
 
 24.  At the same time, my essay does end up making a version of this criticism: Rawls leaves 
out punishment as part of his political theory, and this is a very serious failing. But at the same 
time, I see it more as an expression of disappointment, not a criticism per se.  
 25.  See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 240–42.   
 26.  See id. at 240. 
 27.  Id.  
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the law out of preference, we might think others will all too easily break 
the law when it suits them. And we might worry that we would be 
tempted to do the same thing.28 
If this is accurate, we might need to have a system of punishment 
set up for the sake of our sense of security: that others will really live 
up to their obligation to obey the law—and that we will too. We need 
the assurance, that if people’s sense of justice fails, then at least there 
is a “back-up” system of incentives to (in the Kantian jargon) act ac-
cording to duty even if not to act from duty. And we need this system 
even if we postulate that everyone is going to obey the law and so the 
penal sanctions will never need to be used. 
That is to say, we need the system of penal sanctions even in a fully 
just society, one marked by full compliance, so even “ideal theory re-
quires an account of penal sanctions as a stabilizing device . . . .”29 It is, 
again, a matter of ideal theory because it shows how a system of pun-
ishment will exist even in a society where by hypothesis everyone obeys 
the law. It is not about what to do when someone breaks the law. Ex 
hypothesi, in an ideal society no one breaks the law and no one is ac-
tually punished. Yet we still have a punishment system, the existence 
of which “serves as men’s security to one another.”30 
Keeping this in mind can also help us interpret Rawls’s later treat-
ment of punishment and ideal theory, which is where some of his 
harsher remarks appear. In Section III of Theory, Rawls raises the im-
portant question: what is the relationship of our good, our happiness, 
to justice?31 What if it turns out the principles of justice ask us to live 
in a way that, for most of us, makes us miserable?32 Rawls wants to 
assure us that this will not be the case and that the “strains of commit-
ment” of justice as fairness are less, if not non-existent, especially as 
compared to what utilitarianism may ask of us.33 The principles of jus-
 
 28.  In what follows, I am indebted to Paul Weithman’s excellent discussion of stability 
and sanctions in PAUL WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM?: ON JOHN RAWLS’S 
POLITICAL TURN 50–51 (2010). Weithman is discussing Hobbes, but Rawls indicates his debt 
to Hobbes in this part of RAWLS, supra note 7, at 240 n.24.  
 29.  RAWLS, supra note 7, at 241. 
 30.  Id. at 240. 
 31.  Id. at 395.  The discussion of “the good of justice” for a person takes place in Chapter 
IX of Theory. 
 32.  “The problem,” Rawls says in one passage, is whether the desire to “adopt the stand-
point of justice belongs to a person’s own good.”  Id. at 568.   
 33.  Id. at 572–73.   
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tice, Rawls wants to argue, are both individually and collectively ra-
tional.34 They are good for society—the form of society they present 
is a good one—and they are good for the individual person. 
But in an aside, Rawls asks what if, “even in a well-ordered society 
there are some persons for whom the affirmation of their sense of jus-
tice is not a good”?35 In the case of a person who does not see following 
his sense of justice as a good for him, there is a lack of congruence. He 
will find obeying the law as a real burden because he is not realizing 
his nature. Of him, Rawls says that his “nature is his misfortune.”36 It 
is his misfortune, because the principles of justice still remain justified, 
and so in the abstract worth following and collectively rational for all 
that, even if they are not good for him. They are the principles of jus-
tice we would all choose behind the veil of ignorance, and it is his bad 
luck that upon removing the veil, he chafes against the principles of 
justice rather than finding them at least consistent (if not congruent) 
with his good. 
We cannot, Rawls says, let this person hijack the collectively ra-
tional principles of justice and tailor them towards his good, to allow 
him to break the law because he is unhappy.37 But, we have to be care-
ful here. Rawls is not saying that there would be people like this in the 
well-ordered society. All he is saying is in the conditional. If there is a 
person like this, the principles of justice—it almost follows—would be 
bad for him because we are dealing with precisely of the (hypothetical) 
case of a lack of congruence between a person’s good and the principles 
of justice. 
Still in the conditional: What if a lot of people in the well-ordered 
society are like this? Now, Rawls cannot rule this out altogether; pre-
sumably his hope is that the well-ordered society will produce people 
in which the sense of justice is consistent with their good, but maybe 
this is not a reasonable hypothesis about the good of human sociabil-
ity.38 But even in the case where justice is not a good for most people, 
 
 34.  Id. at 577.   
 35.  Id. at 575. 
 36.  Id. at 576. 
 37.  Id. at 575–76 (rejecting the idea that a person can be required to do “only what is to 
his advantage”).   
 38. See id. at 522–23, 527 (expositing the good of human sociability). It is possible that 
Rawls thought that a well-ordered society would “solve” crime. After all, the people in the well-
ordered society will have been raised in a well-ordered society, and so had ample opportunity to 
cultivate their sense of justice. They would also, presumably, have “enough” primary goods so 
they would not steal or commit other crimes in order to live decent lives. I do not think Rawls 
held this position, although I don’t pursue the point at any length here.  
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Rawls will still say that the principles of justice are still collectively ra-
tional. And so in that society—where there are a lot of people who find 
following the principles of justice makes them miserable—we will have 
to rely on penal sanctions a lot more. Again, we need to be careful here. 
Rawls is not talking about actually using penal sanctions on anyone. In 
fact, Rawls does not really say much about actually employing penal 
sanctions and he should not because his project is a project in ideal 
theory. But even an ideal society will have to rely at least on the threat 
of penal sanctions as a stabilizing mechanism. We need these mecha-
nisms not because we want to punish people, but we want to have an 
extra assurance that people, including ourselves, will obey the princi-
ples of justice. 
Summing up, “penal devices” in a society with a lot of people who 
do not find their good in being just will play a much larger role not 
necessarily because a lot of people will be punished, but because a lot 
more people will find their motivation for acting according to the prin-
ciples of justice underwritten by the fear of sanctions rather than by a 
love of justice. The fear of punishment, not actual punishment, will 
loom larger in the minds of many in the society. However, the purpose 
of the sanctions is not in the first instance to punish, but rather to “un-
derwrite citizens’ trust in one another.”39 It is about how we relate to 
one another as citizens in a well-ordered society, not how some people 
punish other people when they break the law. 
We are still in the land of ideal theory. We are not talking about 
what happens to people who break the law, but about what to do with 
people who may be less than perfectly motivated to obey the law. A 
society in which “penal sanctions play a much larger role” could still 
be a system in which all people comply with the law. And it had better 
be, for it to still be a wholly “ideal” society. It is just that for some 
people in that society, reasons for compliance will not be their sense of 
justice, but their fear of punishment. Such a society will probably be a 
lot less stable than one in which people mostly act out of their love of 
justice.40 There will probably be more mistrust, and more need to 
point to the existence of a system of penal sanctions. At the limit, if the 
only reason anyone was behaving justly was because of the fear of pun-
ishment, we might have to rethink the theory: the strains of commit-
ment would be too great, and the whole system could collapse. But 
 
 39.  Id. at 575.  
 40.  See WEITHMAN, supra note 28, at 50–51.  
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Rawls does not think this is a real possibility although, I suppose, he 
cannot rule it out in principle. 
What is interesting on this interpretation of Rawls’s remarks is that 
we are only talking about the threat of punishment. Nothing in what 
he says explicitly deals with what we do with people who fail to obey 
that threat. It is possible that people do not get punished, but treated. 
The ideal society needs punishment, but only as a sort of signal to the 
members of society that if their fellow citizens aren’t moved by justice 
there are other things that are there to move them. Whether or not we 
have to make good on what those threats say, as H. L. A. Hart showed 
in his discussion of Bentham, is another question.41 That we have a 
system of threats of sanctions does not mean that we have a system of 
actually employed sanctions. Whether and how we impose those sanc-
tions is, in the end, a question for non-ideal theory. 
B.  Distributive Versus Retributive Justice 
The distinction Rawls makes between distributive and retributive 
justice is a little more familiar, and so needs less exposition.42 My point 
here is not necessarily to say anything new, but to see the contrasts 
Rawls draws (between ideal and non-ideal, between retributive and dis-
tributive justice) as not really a part of his main theory, and as putting 
that theory into a sort of relief. Again, I am trying to read Rawls char-
itably in this part. I do not want to identify him with the harsh rhetoric 
and its implications if I can help it—at least initially. Above, I tried to 
do this by saying that the language of ramping up sanctions and of 
some people having the “misfortune” to have a certain nature as apply-
ing only to the existence of sanctions to make sure people will follow 
the law. It did not mean that there would be any such people, or even 
that sanctions would be used. It is harder to do with Rawls’s remarks 
on retributive justice, where he seems to endorse that as the purpose 
of punishment, but it is possible. 
Rawls introduces the contrast between distributive and retributive 
 
 41.  Hart’s argument strictly speaking runs the other way around: that the fact that a threat 
is ineffectual does not mean that there is not any value in imposing the punishment. See H. L. A. 
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 18–20 (1968). The larger point, I take it, is that the 
threat and the punishment can be analytically separated. Many have tried to justify the imposition 
of punishment based on the idea of legitimate threats, but it has always been a problem with these 
theories to transition from the justified threat of punishment to the justified imposition of pun-
ishment. See, e.g., WARREN QUINN, MORALITY AND ACTION 52 (1993).  
 42.  See Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Saved?, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 309 (2014). 
FLANDERS.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  9:00 AM 
83]                                                                 Criminals Behind the Veil  
95 
justice to resist the idea that, like retributive justice, distributive justice 
should be based on merit. But Rawls says that this contrast is funda-
mentally misguided. There really is no such thing as a pre-institutional 
economic desert. In fact, the very notion is fantastical. Economic de-
sert, if it exists at all, is the upshot of a “scheme of taxes and burdens 
designed to put a price on certain forms of conduct and in this way to 
guide men’s conduct for mutual advantage.”43 In the economic 
realm—the scheme of taxes and burdens—what we have are legitimate 
expectations created by institutions, not anything that we can be said 
to pre-institutionally deserve. The economic sphere creates the expec-
tations; it does not exist to satisfy pre-existing claims of desert. 
Contrast this, Rawls says, with how we think of the criminal law. 
There, we do have a sense of right and wrong, and accordingly of de-
sert. Those who have violated the criminal law have normally, Rawls 
says, done something that we can see as wrong apart from the existence 
of natural duties.44 They have injured someone or killed someone. 
Punishments regulate something that it would be if they “were never 
done.”45 Moreover, those who do the bad things—that the criminal 
law prohibits—really do show “a mark of bad character.”46 If they show 
these characters by doing bad acts, they really do deserve to be pun-
ished.47 It would be perverse, Rawls seems to be saying, if we saw pun-
ishment as just a system of “taxes and burdens” to regulate conduct.48 
No, there are some things that are simply wrong to do and those things 
deserve to be punished. There is a fundamental contrast between the 
distributive and the retributive. 
It is tempting—and mostly possible—to read what Rawls says here 
as not really in his voice. It is tempting, that is, to read it in the follow-
ing way: “A lot of people may see retributive justice as pointing to the 
way in which we should also think of distributive shares. People see the 
criminal law and punishment as serving a function that is based on de-
sert. Whether or not that is the case, the contrast is a mistaken one.” 
In other words, Rawls can be read not as endorsing a theory of retrib-
utive justice, where people deserve to be punished, but as simply put-
ting such a theory in the mouth of an opponent. His broader point is 
 
 43.  RAWLS, supra note 7, at 314–15. 
 44.  Id.   
 45.  Id. at 315. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 314–15. 
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that we should not think of economic desert as the basis for a system 
of distributive justice. He does not need to believe in the theory of 
retributive justice he lays out, only that the “opinion” of the person 
who thinks that because retributive justice is one way (punishment ac-
cording to desert), distributive justice has to be that way, too (eco-
nomic rewards according to desert). 
We can go a lot of the way toward ascribing this sort of strategy to 
Rawls, although maybe we cannot go all the way.49 It is hard to say 
with any real certainty what Rawls is doing here. Rawls does seem at 
points to be speaking in his own voice. One place where this seems 
especially clear is in how he links up punishment to his theory of nat-
ural duties of justice. Rawls says, “the purpose of the criminal law is to 
uphold basic natural duties . . . .”50 These are duties that exist prior to 
any institutional scheme. We have an obligation to do them, regardless 
of whether we are part of the “scheme of taxes and burdens”51 or not. 
And Rawls is correct that these are things that it is always the case that 
it would be “far better if . . . [they] were never done.”52 But it is unclear 
that believing this entails anything like saying that those acts are marks 
of a bad character, which is what Rawls goes on to say. (As we will see 
in the next part, saying this seems to be inconsistent with what Rawls 
says elsewhere in Theory about what goes into a person’s character.) 
In the next paragraph, Rawls reverts again to the ideal/non-ideal dis-
tinction when he says that punishment in ideal theory is about assur-
ance, not about actual punishment.53 For the most part, Rawls goes on 
to say, criminal justice is for partial compliance theory, and it does not 
follow from this that we have to believe anything about character or 
desert in punishment given what Rawls says about punishment in ideal 
theory.54 
And such a reading of Rawls—where he is not committing himself 
to a theory of punishment based on desert—fits better with what Rawls 
had said earlier about punishment. In his first discussion of the ideal 
theory of punishment, where he says that even ideal theory needs a 
limited account of punishment, Rawls says that looking at the limited 
way punishment operates in ideal theory we can “see that the principle 
 
 49.  In fact, it is in these passages that my criticism of Rawls gets its foothold.  
 50.  Id. at 314. 
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id. at 315. 
 53.  Id.   
 54.  Id.  
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of responsibility is not founded on the idea that punishment is primar-
ily retributive or denunciatory.”55 Rejecting punishment as retributive 
or denunciatory is consistent with saying that punishment is still justi-
fied, but it seems incompatible with saying that punishment is a matter 
giving “bad characters” what they deserve. We need punishment, as a 
threat and maybe as eventually an applied sanction, to assure one an-
other that there are incentives for compliance, incentives that can fill 
whatever gap there is between peoples’ sense of justice and their actual 
behavior. Rawls even in these pages says that it is as a stabilizing de-
vice—and not, say, a device for securing “just deserts”—that the idea 
of punishment first gets its foothold in his theory.56 We simply need 
the rules to guarantee compliance, not to serve any further end, like 
giving bad characters their due. Thus, we might read Rawls’s remarks 
on retributive justice as mostly setting up a contrast with distributive 
justice, and perhaps hinting at a non-ideal set-up—but not as present-
ing his own “positive” retributive view on punishment. 
III. WHAT’S STILL WRONG WITH RAWLS ON PUNISHMENT—
AND HOW TO FIX IT 
I have tried, in the previous part, to read Rawls in a way that gets 
him off the hook for some of his harsher remarks on punishment—
about whom we punish and why we punish them. We can read his 
statements as not really in his own voice, or at worst speculations about 
what a non-ideal theory might look like that we can take or leave. Gen-
erally speaking, even if they are in his own voice, there is not much 
here to go on, so we should be wary of trying to divine a fully-worked-
out theory of punishment somehow implicit in what he says mostly in 
passing. There is no theory there. That is bad enough, but maybe not 
as bad as a worked-out theory that is harsh or essentialist or otherwise 
objectionable. 
In this part, I still want to say that there are problems with the way 
punishment is treated by Rawls in Theory. Maybe the biggest problem 
is the fact that the book has so little to say about punishment. I think 
this silence says a lot, and it also has probably set the agenda for much 
of political theory: for most of the last fifty years, political theorists 
have been debating distributive justice and not the state’s role in pun-
 
 55.  Id. at 241. 
 56.  Id.   
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ishment, which is certainly the most obvious and most worrisome in-
stance of state coercive power.57 And Rawls continued not to talk about 
punishment in Political Liberalism, even though that work is in many 
ways quintessentially non-ideal: it responds to real world conditions 
(in particular, the existence of “reasonable pluralism”) and how they 
limit the possibilities of overlapping consensus.58 Political Liberalism 
is also historical in a way that Theory is sometimes not. I suspect (and 
have not been the only one to suspect) there is a sort of ideological 
blindness to the very way Theory is structured, in that it deals with 
ideal theory rather than non-ideal theory.59 
At the very least, it is a missed opportunity. Rawls sets up a com-
pelling and inspiring way of looking at society in Theory. It is a model 
of “fraternal” cooperation, where we are linked to our fellow citizens 
in a “social union of social unions.”60 When we leave out those we pun-
ish—both in the set up of the theory and in its “ideal” application—we 
implicitly say that those who break the law cannot be part of this social 
union. They are banished, as it were. This is not to say that there are 
problems—theoretical and practical—with the idea that criminals are 
also fellow-citizens.61 But Rawls as a matter of the structure of his the-
ory puts this problem to one side and thus in a way answers it. So in 
this part I do two things: (1) I show how different Rawls is on distrib-
utive justice, as opposed to the way he discusses criminal justice (when 
he does discuss it), and (2) I try to imagine how a Rawlsian theory of 
punishment would look, if we ignored the way Rawls brackets prob-
lems of criminal justice. I will admit I am not the only person who has 
tried the latter; more than a few people have.62 But for one reason or 
the other, the idea has not stuck. 
 
 57.  Again, my point is not that there has not been philosophy of punishment, but that 
there has not been much political philosophy of punishment.  
 58.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).   
 59.  See Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 20 HYPATIA 165 (2005).  
 60.  RAWLS, supra note 7, at 527. 
 61.  For instructive thoughts on this issue, see R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, 
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001). 
 62.  In addition to Dolovich, see GLEN LOURY, RACE, INCARCERATION AND AMERICAN 
VALUES (2008); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE (2010). See also Samuel J.M. Donnelly, The 
Goals of Criminal Punishment: A Rawlsian Theory (Ultimately Grounded in Multiple Views 
Concerned With Human Dignity), 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 741 (1990).  
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A. The Invidious Contrast Between Distributive and Retributive 
Justice 
Start with two big ideas of Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness: first, 
the idea that for true equality of opportunity, we have to start with the 
assumption that who we are, our talents, are not really ours, in the 
sense that we really do not deserve them; and second, the idea that we 
should choose from behind the veil with the idea that we could be one 
of the people who is “the worst off.” These are of course crude sum-
maries of ideas that are expounded upon at length in Theory; I do not 
mean to have captured all of their subtlety in my paraphrase. But surely 
some of the power of these ideas is in their broad, vague appeal, and in 
the orientation they suggest. In a just society, we take into account that 
people have different starting points, and that we should not give our-
selves airs that we hit a triple when we were really born on third base. 
Nor should we design policy just to help ourselves; we should think 
first about those least well off. All of this suggests a radical empathy, 
which I believe suffuses a Theory of Justice and explains a lot of its 
enduring appeal. 
But as they are applied in Theory, these two ideas also show the 
severe limits of that empathy. Start with the idea that underlies much 
of Rawls’s approach to desert. We are not responsible for the families 
we are born in, or the city, or the nation. Where we start out is a matter 
of luck. But Rawls takes this point and starts even further back. If we 
are not responsible for where we start out, neither are we really re-
sponsible for what we start out with.63 We all are born with certain 
innate abilities and talents, which, to be sure social circumstances can 
help us realize or not, but which still are to some extent independent 
of them. This may be especially obvious in the case of certain mental 
and physical disabilities; these will limit people from the very begin-
ning, and no amount of subsequently added social capital may be able 
to fully make up for that lack. 
So Rawls designs much of his theory around the idea that because 
we are not responsible for our virtues, or the lack thereof, we cannot 
run society around any firm idea of merit or entitlement based on our 
 
 63.  RAWLS, supra note 7, at 311–12. 
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talents. Some people may be lazy, or impatient, or worse, but this is no 
fault of their own. We cannot blame them for it. Neither can we credit 
people for their talents; these, too, are mostly a matter of luck. We 
should look at others and say, “There but for the grace of God (or 
circumstances) go I.” We are in a sense only vehicles for those talents, 
not deserving what results from them “any more than one deserves 
one’s initial starting place in society.”64 
I do not want to get into whether this is an adequate theory of who 
we are, that is, whether it gets our identities as persons with traits 
right.65 Nor, for that matter, am I that concerned with how this con-
ception of our talents fits with another of Rawls’s big ideas, which is 
that in the economic sphere it is a bit nonsensical to say that there is 
really any meaningful sense of “desert.”66 Certainly the idea that we 
don’t deserve our talents relates in some way to the idea that it is inco-
herent to talk about economic desert.67 All I want to insist is that there 
is also a sense in which it would be wrong to give people more money 
just by virtue of the talents they have as a matter of sheer luck. 
The point I want to make here is to note that Rawls here seems 
only concerned with things like laziness or impatience or general lack 
of talent: those kinds of less-than-optimal character traits that may 
make us unable to compete in the marketplace. He is not concerned 
with people who may have the kinds of character that will incline them 
not just to not succeed, but who may have a tendency to break the law 
of any given scheme of social cooperation. Of course, it is possible and 
even likely that those characteristics that make people not do well in 
the market may also incline them to criminal behavior: they may tend 
to discount the future consequences of their immediate actions, for ex-
ample.68 Rawls is not interested in those who cross the line from legal 
but inefficient behavior to illegal behavior. 
Part of this, of course, is attributable to Rawls’s interest in ideal 
theory. But it is hard to avoid this implication: people who are lazy are 
not to be blamed for that character trait, but those who break the law 
are responsible for their bad characters. That is, it is not that hard to 
 
 64.  RAWLS, supra note 7, at 104. 
 65.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).  
 66.  See, e.g., SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF 
JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT (2001) (especially pressing this interpre-
tation).  
 67.  I go into this more in Flanders, supra note 42.  
 68.  See Dolovich, supra note 8, at 319 for a similar point. 
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read Rawls’s points about our natural duties and about retributive jus-
tice in this light. When we get to criminal justice, we are dealing with 
acts of people that really reveal their characters in what they do and 
those actions are not just the upshot of luck, or fate. People who break 
the law have a choice whether to break the law or not; not so people 
who lack certain talents or who are just lazy or impatient or lack the 
talent to compete in the marketplace. The latter group is not respon-
sible for what they have become, and so we must share their fates.69 
People who break the law are responsible for what they do, and so they 
have only themselves to blame.70 
In this way, then, those who tend to break the rules—the crimi-
nals—are left out at the front end. The accidents and social circum-
stances that led them to be what they are is not the fault of society, it 
is their fault alone, their nature is revealed in their bad acts, and their 
nature is their misfortune. The pieces do seem to fit together, if we 
work at it. 
But there is also a way in which criminals are left out at the back 
end as well—and here I want to get to another of Rawls’s big ideas, 
namely, that society should be ordered in such a way as to help out 
those who are the “least advantaged members of society.”71 In consid-
ering those least well off, in imagining who we might be when the veil 
is lifted, we are not to imagine that we might be disposed to rebel 
against our sense of justice, or not have a sense of justice at all. System-
atically, the original position excludes those from consideration who 
might be tempted to not follow the principles of justice when the veil 
is lifted. Systematically, we are not to direct our empathy toward them 
in deciding whom to designate as the “least advantaged.” 
Again, this move of exclusion can be justified by Rawls’s saying that 
he is interested in only ideal theory. He does not want people to be 
 
 69.  See generally RAWLS, supra note 7, at 311–12 (“[T]he initial endowment[s] . . . in 
early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view. The precept which seems intuitively to come 
closest to rewarding moral desert is that of distribution according to effort, or perhaps better, 
conscientious effort. Once again, however, it seems clear that the effort a person is willing to 
make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him.”) (emphasis 
added).  
 70.  We might think this is a Kantian version of freedom: you can always choose not to 
break the law, so this is not a morally salient characteristic behind the veil. But why couldn’t we 
say of the person who is lazy: you should work harder! In fact, Kant probably thought that we 
could demand this of him. But Rawls does not. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 73–74. In either case, 
to deny that there are some social and biological determinants of criminal behavior seems to me 
incorrect—one cannot just “choose” not to have the sort of temperament that may lead one to 
break the law rather than comply with it.  
 71.  Id. at 15.   
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picking principles of justice for those who would break the law, or de-
signing “just” institutions around them.72 As he says, it does not have 
to be the case that the principles of justice will answer to the good of 
everyone, nor is it a fair expectation that we should adjust the princi-
ples of justice to the good of those who would harm the good of other 
people. So we adopt the assumption that people are choosing princi-
ples for those who are going to obey them, who care about the good 
of others, and not just their own. We do make concessions to those 
who struggle in the market—this is why we have the difference princi-
ple, and not some other principle—but not those who break the law.73 
Fair enough. But note how this sets up the following picture of 
society. Those who are within the distributive scheme, who play by the 
rules, even though they may struggle at times—they are part of the 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage. They are the people we 
want to see succeed, or at least manage, in society. Then there are 
those who are outside of it: not considered within the original position, 
and, when the veil is removed, not part of the cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage. They are not treated as needing incentives or dis-
tributive shares or anything; they get punished when they break the 
law because their nature leads them to break the law rather than to 
work within it. They do not get the benefits of those who are desig-
nated the least well off in society, even though we might think that it 
is an accident of nature, of fortune, that they are the way that they are. 
In general, justice as fairness tries to counteract the effects of chance 
and nature and the arbitrary hand of fate. Not here. 
Might this picture seem all too familiar? Imagine a politician who 
says something along these lines: 
There are some people who are poor, but they are the good poor, the 
working poor. For them, we extend to them welfare, or maybe even 
a guaranteed income; certainly we give them a break on the taxes they 
pay. They need a hand up. But then there are those who are not the 
good poor. They are the ones who try to get ahead by breaking the 
rules, by stealing, killing, or some other crime. Or they are impulsive, 
and their impulsiveness leads them to violate the law. It is important 
to punish the bad poor, those who break the law, because after all 
they had a choice (look at the good poor!) to do or not do what they 
 
 72.  But see RAWLS, supra note 7, at 31.  
 73.  As an aside, the fact that we do not think of criminals pre-veil does not mean that we 
cannot think about them post-veil. In fact, Rawls’s remarks on “tolerating the intolerant” shows 
how this can be done. See id. at 220.  
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did. And when they are done being punished, it is up to them to fig-
ure out how to get ahead in society. Moreover, they in some sense 
(even after they have been punished) do not deserve help from soci-
ety. So, it is OK if we attach to them post-punishment disabilities 
that make it harder for them to get a job or to get public housing or 
to get education. After all, it is not our fault that they committed the 
crime; it is not our fault that they have the nature they do. 
Again, in Part I of this essay, I tried to explain how we do not have 
to attribute this picture to Rawls. But nonetheless, we can read those 
passages in Theory, the ones that are so distressing, as in some way 
fitting this picture. There is an asymmetry between the distributive 
and the retributive. So long as one works hard and plays by the rules, 
that individual has a place in society, even if that person is not the most 
talented, even if they need a helping hand. But when the individual 
breaks the rules, our attitude towards the individual shifts, or seems to; 
we blame them, we hold them responsible, and the appropriate re-
sponse is punishment, not help, not welfare. Committing crimes is a 
“mark of bad character” and legal punishment should fall upon the in-
dividual when they commit a crime. Insofar as following just rules is 
not part of that individual’s good, then, sorry, their nature is their own 
misfortune. Of course, I am reading into the silences here. But is the 
reading that far off?74 
B.  Reconstructing Rawls 
Rawls excludes criminals from his picture, those who break the law, 
either because for methodological reasons he excludes them, or for 
reasons having to do with what he thinks (but does not elaborate on in 
 
 74.  Is it? Consider this passage from Scheffler’s essay on Rawls and distributive and re-
tributive justice:  
The problem of retributive justice is not the problem of how to allocate a limited sup-
ply of benefits among equally worthy citizens but rather than problem of how society 
can ever be justified in imposing the special burden of punishment on a particular 
human being. To put it another way, the establishment of penal institutions is a social 
response, not to allocative concerns, but rather to exercises of individual agency that 
society deems intolerable.  
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory, in BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES 
173, 192–93 (2001). Note how punishment in this picture becomes, fundamentally, about impos-
ing sanctions on an individual human being’s exercise of his “particular” agency. But why frame 
things this way? Why not treat crime as a social problem that deserves a social response but not 
necessarily a punitive/retributive one? Asking the question this way I take to be a major theme of 
Vincent Chiao’s recent work. See Vincent Chiao, Two Conceptions of the Criminal Law, in THE 
NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 19 (Chad Flanders & Zach Hoskins eds., 2016).  
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Theory) about retributive justice and about people’s character when 
they commit crimes. The sympathetic reading of Rawls attributes this 
exclusion to the fact that Rawls is doing ideal theory, and that some-
times he introduces retributive justice as a point of contrast—not that 
he believes in it. The less sympathetic reading, even the aggressively 
hostile reading of Rawls, has him putting criminals pretty much out-
side of the social contract. But whether the exclusion is methodological 
or substantive, there is something that the two readings share. They 
both say we treat criminals separately because they are in some sense 
outside of a theory of justice. They are instead to be treated as part of 
a non-ideal theory of punishment. The only real question that is left is 
whether we are on our own to divine what this non-ideal theory would 
look like, or whether Rawls has already dropped some hints in Theory. 
But what if we started not with exclusion, but with inclusion? We 
would, for starters, remove the artificial distinction between responsi-
bility for good and for bad character.75 Put people who cannot compete 
in the marketplace, or who have strange or out of the ordinary concep-
tions of the good, on par with those who for reasons of social accident 
lack a sense of justice, or find their good not in following their sense 
of justice. Treat all people as not deserving their characters, all the way 
down, and figure out how to organize society on those grounds. And 
get rid of the idea that the economic sphere is a scheme where we all 
contribute and all agree to share one another’s fates, but that the 
sphere of law and order is a separate one, where each one of us is indi-
vidually responsible for our flaws. Finally, look at those who commit 
crimes, and who may suffer punishment for them, as possible objects 
of empathy, just as those who lack skills or talents to keep up with the 
Joneses. Do not look at lack of compliance as something to be treated 
only by ramping up sanctions to deter bad behavior. Look at the sanc-
tions as possibly befalling fellow citizens, and draw up societal rules for 
law-breaking and for punishments accordingly. 
If we do all this, then we can start looking at responsibility for 
criminal behavior as falling on all of us—or on none of us, individu-
ally—in the same way that we start looking at the economic system as 
all of ours, and not each of ours, individually. It is a system of incentives 
and prohibitions, and we try to make it work out to the benefit of all, 
 
 75.  Michael J. Sandel goes very far in this direction, and is rather convincing (in my view). 
But then he flinches, and says that considerations of reflective equilibrium might come in to 
reintroduce the distinction between distributive and retributive justice. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 89–92 (1982).  
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especially the least well off. It is certainly true that it is better (as Rawls 
says) that some things, such as violations of natural duties, never hap-
pen.76 But there are two ways we can look at that. We can look at it as 
a matter of punishing those that fail to live up to their natural duties. 
Or we can look at it as a collective failure, which we try to prevent, and 
then when it happens, we try to remedy and correct. 
This latter view is what I am pushing here, because it seems to me 
more consistent with what Theory as a whole says about desert. That 
is, if we kick desert out of both distributive and retributive justice, then 
both of them become importantly demoralized. We do not reward vir-
tue with happiness, nor do we punish bad character with punishment. 
Instead, we treat them both as things to be regulated as part of a larger 
system. We try our best to fairly distribute both happiness and punish-
ment in ways that maximize the good of the whole, and especially max-
imize the prospects of the least well off.77 
Of course one part of this is to set up clear rules so people know 
what side of the line to stay on (notice is still important). We try, that 
is, to avoid violations of natural duties in the first place by making clear 
what people should and should not do. Again, it is better that a viola-
tion of the natural duties not happen at all. And it may even be to the 
best that we threaten harsh sanctions if people fail to live up to their 
natural duties. But it is not obvious that what follows from violations 
of natural duties is punishment. For one, it is probably the case that 
those who lack a sense of justice should be counted among the least 
well-off. They are not able to enjoy the good of justice, which is a very 
great good, both individually and collectively. Their nature is, in a real 
sense, their misfortune on those grounds alone (this is the more opti-
mistic way to read that passage in Rawls). Moreover, it is not obvious 
that punishment is the best way to maximize the good of the whole, 
even bracketing for the moment its effects on the individual who might 
be punished. Punishment—especially in the form of incarceration—
may not be a rational response to crime, if what we want to do is to 
reduce crime and improve overall welfare.78 At the very least, it should 
be an open question of whether we should sanction people who violate 
 
 76.  RAWLS, supra note 7, at 315. 
 77.  I find traces of this view in RAWLS, supra note 7, at 241–43, but I will not conduct a 
textual exegesis here.  
 78.  See, e.g., TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS 
INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE ch. 7 (2007). 
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the law, rather than treat them or forgive them.79 
I see two major parts to this reconstructed Rawls on punishment. 
The first, and more important, is to treat punishment in society as 
something that is not a matter of desert, but a matter of efficiency: we 
are not trying to fix blame, but trying to fix a problem. How do we 
decrease crime? How do we organize the scheme of benefits and bur-
dens in order to decrease the possibility that some will be tempted to 
break the law? One way of doing this will be sanctions, but there are 
other ways—indeed (and this may be implicit in Rawls all along) a big 
way will be assuring that people have enough, and the crime will not 
be a response to need. But we cannot assume that in the well-ordered 
society no one will ever break the law. This is too much of an idealiza-
tion. Even when people have enough, and have been raised well, there 
may still be crime and we will have to ask how to approach it in our 
non-ideal world. Do we say, at that point, that the people who have 
enough or who aren’t deterred by threats of sanctions deserve punish-
ment because such acts reveal their “bad character.” Or do we instead 
take a more holistic view, and say what good is really achieved by pun-
ishment in terms of preventing future crimes and reject the idea that 
punishment is primarily retributive? 
The second part to the reconstructed Rawls deals with function of 
punishment. If we take the Rawls of Part III of Theory seriously, I 
think it suggests that we should view in large part the function of actual 
punishment—as opposed to threatened punishment—as rehabilitative, 
as opposed to retributive. We should try to show people that their 
good is in following their sense of justice. We might have an interest 
in doing this, beyond considerations of efficiency—this is part and par-
cel of imagining that we ourselves when we lift the veil might be sub-
ject to punishment. It is also part of the idea that those who are pun-
ished may themselves be members of the “least well off,” or at least 
that punishment could make them so. This thought—that when de-
ciding on what the purpose of punishment is, we should consider that 
we ourselves may be the object of punishment—that puts a check on 
the consequentialism of the first part. We would not want to license 
just any treatment of those whom we deem to need sanctions. In fact, 
 
 79.  I also think (and argue in an unpublished essay) that those who are punished too 
harshly might complain justly about “the strains of commitment” they face in society. In fact, I 
think many in present-day American society may legitimately make such a complaint. See Flan-
ders, supra note 3.   
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I think it tends to the position that though we may threaten punish-
ment, actual punishment may not be justified, not as a matter of con-
sequences, nor even as a matter of how we, looking sympathetically at 
ourselves pre-the lifting of the veil, would like ourselves to be treated. 
It seems to me we can bring both of these steps to a point. Taking 
a page from Sharon Dolovich, in her magisterial (and lengthy) recon-
struction of Rawls on criminal justice,80 we can see ourselves, from be-
hind the veil as either potential victims of crime or potential objects of 
punishment. As potential victims of crimes, our interest is in not being 
victimized by crime in the first place, so overall in setting up a system 
of notices and incentives and punishments to prevent this from hap-
pening. We should have no first order interest just in seeing people 
punished.81 As potential objects of punishment, we should wish to 
avoid punishment—and the suffering attendant to it—and we should 
hope that we might be instead objects of reform, so that we can better 
follow the principles of justice. Any interest we might have in purely 
expiatory suffering we work on satisfying on our own time because 
from behind the veil we cannot know that we would have such a com-
prehensive point of view.82 We cannot, and should not, impute such a 
controversial view onto our post-veil selves. 
The bottom line seems to be this: from either perspective—that of 
a victim of crime or that of an object of punishment—the idea that we 
have a system of penal sanctions for purely retributive or purely de-
nunciatory purposes does not find a place. Other theories fit better for 
the purposes of a public political conception of justice. Rawls tinkers 
with jettisoning the idea of punishment as “purely retributive or de-
nunciatory” in the well-ordered society, where we have perfect com-
pliance.83 But why can it not also be true in a world of less than com-
plete compliance? 
 
 80.  See Dolovich, supra note 8.  
 81.  I suppose, privately, we might delight in seeing the wicked suffer; but this is a matter 
of our personal conception of the good. It is not appropriate for a public political conception 
(especially since we do not know—pre-veil being lifted—that we actually will delight in the 
wicked suffering).  
 82.  These lines are meant to address the view (given eloquent expression by Michael S. 
Moore) that if we did wrong, we would want to suffer. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth 
of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). 
 83.  RAWLS, supra note 7, at 241. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In her book, Frontiers of Justice, Martha Nussbaum looks closely 
at those groups that are excluded from Rawls’s social contract theory, 
mainly for methodological reasons: the sick and the old, members of 
other nations, animals, etc.84 Her point is that when we include those 
groups in a theory of justice, we need to make major revisions to the 
theory—we cannot leave everything as it was, and just slot these groups 
in. Rather, the theory requires a fundamental reworking to accommo-
date these groups. And it should accommodate these groups, Nuss-
baum insists: a good theory of justice cannot just leave certain groups 
out, or put them off to later.85 They need to be in at the ground level, 
something a theory of justice better tell us something about, to be a 
theory of justice worth its salt. 
Nussbaum’s groups, however, all still work within the law.86 My 
paper has considered those who violate the law. Should not a fully 
worked-out theory of justice tell us how to deal with them? In one way, 
this can be read as a complaint about ideal theory, a type of theorizing 
that tells us to disregard those who would break the law ab initio. We 
deal with them later. Of course, Rawls does deal with criminals in his 
book—but in a by-the-way fashion, and one that is less than appealing. 
Because he is writing about those who do follow the law, those who do 
not follow the law look bad: they are those we threaten with sanctions, 
or who really do deserve to be treated badly. At best, we ignore them. 
But what if we included them in the social contract from the be-
ginning? Not to let them dictate the principles of justice, so that raping 
and looting are somehow permissible. Not this. But we could still see 
them as fellow citizens in our social union of social unions, just those 
who have lost their way. We do not have to deal with them with sanc-
tions (unless these are absolutely necessary to prevent more crime 
overall) nor do we need to exclude them from consideration as the least 
well off. We can still see what criminals do as bad but not as disquali-
fying them from treatment as citizens of a well-ordered society. 
The structure and methodology of Theory moves us away from 
this type of thinking. Criminals are outside and other.87 At worst, if 
they creep into the well ordered society then we pummel them into 
 
 84.  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2006).  
 85.  Nussbaum’s overall argument (summarized  here) is itself summarized at id. at 3–4.   
 86.  With animals, they might not be strictly speaking either inside or outside of the law.  
 87.  See Honig, supra note 14.   
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compliance. Or maybe they simply do not form a part of our theory. 
The legacy of this treatment in political philosophy is obvious. In 
much the same way that Political Liberalism was thought to cede eco-
nomic justice to conservatives and only worry about “cultural issues,”88 
so too did Theory earlier cede punishment theory to lawyers and pol-
iticians.89 It gave philosophers permission not to think about criminals 
as part of a theory of justice, and when the prison boom boomed in the 
1970s, philosophers were left flat-footed. They still are, for the most 
part, playing catch-up.90 
Perhaps what is best in Rawls can be used to fix what Rawls, early 
on, decided to leave out. Maybe the solution to leaving out criminals 
is to bring them back in, and think of the distribution of punishment 
in the same way as we think of the distribution of primary goods: not 
as a matter of desert, but as a matter of the good of the whole, and of 
each and every person that is part of that whole. 
 
 
 88.  The seeds of this objection can be found in Brian Barry’s early review of Rawls, John 
Rawls and the Search for Stability 105 ETHICS 874, 913 (1995), where he argues that in the later 
Rawls, the “difference principle” may have to be sacrificed to a desire for consensus among plural 
points of view.   
 89.  Rawls is not alone in this regard; nearly every major book on political philosophy in 
the late twentieth century says next to nothing about punishment. It was not always this way. See 
Flanders & Hoskins, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that criminal justice is properly a problem of 
political philosophy).   
 90.  See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, What Will Future Generations Condemn Us 
For?, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2010, at B01 (“We already know that the massive waste of life in 
our prisons is morally troubling; those who defend the conditions of incarceration usually do so 
in non-moral terms (citing costs or the administrative difficulty of reforms); and we’re inclined 
to avert our eyes from the details.”). 
